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POLICE AND TIDEVES
Rosanna Cavallaro*
VIRTUAL JUSTICE: THE FLAWED
AMERICA. By H. Richard Uviller.
Press. 1996. Pp. xvii, 312. $37.50.

PROSECUTION OF CRIME IN
New Haven: Yale University

"Whatever it is, you should clean up this city here because this city
here is like an open sewer, you know? It's full of filth and scum, and
sometimes I can hardly take it."1

What is it about New York City that has, in the last few years,
spawned a series of books attacking the criminal justice system and
describing a community in which victims' needs are compelling
while the rights of the accused are an impediment to justice? Why
does this apocalyptic vision of the system persist, despite statistics
demonstrating the sharpest decline in the city's and the nation's
crime rates in decades?2 What explains the acute detachment from
the accused that is at the core of this series of books?
In Virtual Justice: The Flawed Prosecution of Crime in America,
Richard Uviller3 adds his voice to those of his fellow New Yorkers,
including Professor George Fletcher and Judge Harold Rothwax,
who have recently advocated reforms of the criminal system.4
Among the reforms they advocate are sharp constrictions of the ex
clusionary rule, the right to counsel, the privilege against self
incrimination, the peremptory challenge, and the admissibility of
* Associate Professor, Suffolk University Law School. A.B. 1983, J.D. 1986, Harvard. Ed. Thanks to my loving family: Dave, Emma, and Sophia.
1. TAXI DRIVER (Bill Phillips Production 1976) (quoting the character Travis Bickle
speaking to presidential candidate Charles Palatine).
2. Violent crime in New York City fell 34% in the period from 1990 through 1995, com
pared with a national drop of just 6.5%. See William Glaberson, Safety and Numbers: A
Special Report: Crime in Region Is Dropping, but Some Pockets Defy Trend, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 27, 1997, at Al.
The decline in New York City's murder -rate has far exceeded that in the nation as a
whole: the City experienced 972 homicides in 1996, fewer than half of those in 1990. See
Michael Cooper, Steep Drop in Random Killings Signals Shift in New York Crime, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 29, 1996, at A25.
3. H. Richard Uviller is Arthur Levitt Professor of Law at Columbia University School of
Law.
4. See GEORGE FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SoME: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL
TRIALS (1995); HAROLD J. ROTIIWAX, GUILTY: THE COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(1995). Professor Fletcher teaches at Columbia University Law School. Harold J. Rothwax,
who died in October 1997, was a judge of the New York State Supreme Court as well as a
lecturer at Columbia University Law School.
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expert testimony.5 Although ostensibly examining these same is
sues with the balance of a scholar rather than the voice of an advo
cate, Uviller's wish list is remarkably congruent with those of the
more contentious Fletcher and Rothwax. And like the work of
Fletcher and Rothwax, the premise of Uviller's analysis is flawed:
the procedural protections he critiques simply have not effected
dramatic changes in the investigation and prosecution of crime and
the sentencing of defendants.
Criminal justice in New York City is, like the city itself, hardly a
national prototype. In terms of volume alone, the system is pecu
liarly burdened.6 In addition, New York presents combined
demographics of race7 and class,8 of access to education,9 housing,10
employment,11 and of the availability of weapons12 and drugs that
5. See FLETCHER, supra note 4, at 28-33, 229-36, 254-55 (use of expert testimony); id. at
250-51 {peremptory challenges); RoTHWAX, supra note 4, at 35-65 (exclusionary rule); id. at
88-106 (right to counsel); id. at 66-87, 186-97 {privilege against self-incrimination).
6. Of the 1,864,000 violent crimes reported nationally in 1994, 497,960 occurred in the
nation's cities. Of this number, 136,522 - 28% of all urban violent crimes - were commit
ted in New York City. Breaking this statistic down by crime, New York City was the scene of

72,540 (11 %) of the nation's 659,870 robberies, 2666 (2.5%) of the nation's 106,014 forcible
rapes, 1,561 (6%) of the nation's 24,526 murders, and 59,755 (5%) of the nation's 1,135,000
aggravated assaults. See U.S. Dept. of Justice, CRIME IN TiiE UNITED STATES: UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS FOR TiiE UNITED STATES: 1994, at 60, 138, 238 (1995).
New York City employs 38,000 police officers, more than any other police force in the
country. See Amnesty Intl., United States ofAmerica: Police Brutality and Excessive Force in
the New York City Police Department 3 (June 1986).
7. For example, 47.9% of all persons in New York City were non-Hispanic white, 26.3%
black, 22.1 % Latino (Hispanic), 6.5% Asian or Pacific Islander, and .3% American Indian,
Eskimo, or Aleut. See BUREAU OF TiiE CENsus, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF
TiiE POPULATION: GENERAL POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS: UNITED STATES 468 tbl. 266
(1992).
8. The Census Bureau estimates that 16.3% of families in New York City had incomes in
1989 that were below the poverty level. See BUREAU OF TiiE CENsus, U.S. DEPT. OF CoM
MERCE, 1990 CENsus OF TiiE POPULATION: SUMMARY OF OCCUPATION, INCOME, AND Pov
ERTY CHARACTERISTICS• METROPOLITAN AREAS 77 tbl. 3. In 1996, approximately
1,007,000, or 11.7% of New York City residents received public assistance and 15.7% re
ceived food stamps. See David Frrestone, A Portrait ofthe City, Painted by the Numbers, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 22, 1996, at 43.
9. In 1990, 31.7% of New Yorkers over age 25 had not completed high school. 1\venty
tlrree percent had a bachelor's degree or higher education. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEPT. OF CoMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARAC
TERISTICS: URBANIZED AREAs at 15 tbl. 1. The public school system in New York is precip
itously close to collapse. In the past year, the system has experienced the most severe
overcrowding in decades, with 91,000 more students registered than it can comfortably ac
commodate. See Pam Belluck, Classes Open in New York City, in Closets, Hallways, Cafete
rias, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1996, at Al.

10. In New York City in 1996, some 107 families sought emergency housing daily. There
were 5693 families in temporary shelter, staying an average of 223 days. There were 336,000
families on the waiting list for public housing. See Frrestone, supra note 8.
11. The Bureau of the Census reported a 9% unemployment rate in New York City in
1990. See BUREAU OF TiiE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULA
TION: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS: URBANIZED AREAS at 38 tbl. 2.
12. The Mayor's Management Report for 1996 reported that police confiscated 12,631
weapons in 1996 and 14,861 in 1995. See Frrestone, supra note 8.
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appear nowhere else in the United States. This does not, however,
prevent Uviller, and other observers, from extrapolating from New
York's experience to conclusions about "Criminal Justice" and the
"Prosecution of Crime in America." Reliance on so idiosyncratic a
model cannot help but produce distortions, and this is one of the
pitfalls of Uviller's book.
Those distortions can perhaps be explained and even corrected
by examining them as products of a distinctly New York sensibility.
Certain crimes have become as closely associated with New York
City as Broadway and the Empire State Building. These crimes
contribute to the sensibility I try to describe in this review, and I
believe that they might go some way toward explaining the subject,
tone, and point of view of Uviller's book. The 1964 murder of
Catherine "Kitty" Genovese is perhaps the oldest, in our contem
porary consciousness, of a long series of episodes that have come to
define the New York criminal paradigm: inexplicable brutality met
by outrageous indifference. It is now a fixture ,of urban mythology
that Kitty Genovese's assailant committed three separate and ulti
mately fatal assaults on her, leaving and returning repeatedly, while
her neighbors listened to her screams for thirty-five minutes with
out calling the police.13 More recent examples include attacks on
young women in Central Park in 1989 and again last year,14 the
deaths of the young daughters of Joel Steinberg and Awilda Lo
pez,15 and the controversial subway shootings by Bernhard Goetz.16
These cases have shaped the city's consciousness of itself. Many
New Yorkers live with the impression that they are under siege and
cannot walk the streets, ride the subway, or enter Central Park
without falling prey to criminal offenders. There is a corresponding
impression that all offenders in New York �ity are inhuman soci
opaths, Zodiac killers, and Sons of Sam.17 Media coverage in New
York and nationally compounds the fear of crime,18 not only by de13. See, e.g., Joseph P. Fried, Killer ofKitty Genovese Is Denied a New Trial, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 14, 1995, at B4.
14. See, e.g., Michael T. Kaufman, New Yorkers Wrestle with a Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
28, 1989, at Al (noting that "[a] week after a jogger was raped and left grievously injured in
Central Park during a rampage by teen-agers, New Yorkers are wrestling with often complex
and paradoxical feelings about the crime").
15. See Frank Bruni, The Case of Alisa: A Child Dies, and the Questions Abound, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 24, 1995, at Bl; Joe Sexton, Mother ofElisa Izquierdo Pleads Guilty to Murder in
a Pivotal Child-Abuse Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1996, at B3.
16. See generally GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF DEFENSE: BERNHARD
GOETZ AND THE LAW ON TRIAL (1988).
17. See, e.g., Norimitsu Onishi, Zodiac Case Suspect Remains an Enigma, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 15, 1996, at A51; Howard Blum, The Suspect Is Quoted on Killings: "It Was a Command
. . . I Had a Sign, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1977, at Al.
18. See THE REAL WAR ON CRIME: THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
CoMMISSION 69 (Steven R. Donziger ed., 1996) [hereinafter THE REAL WAR ON CRIME]
(noting that the National Criniinal Justice Commission [NCJC] reported that "[c]overage of

1438

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 96:1435

voting disproportionate attention to the extremes,19 but also by
conveying the sense that few criminals are caught and fewer still are
convicted or punished.20 Of course, none of these impressions is
accurate. The vast majority of crimes and offenders are ordinary,
the same as one would find elsewhere in the country, although
more numerous. Furthermore, New York City crime rates have
dipped dramatically in recent years, demonstrating unambiguously
that New York is a safer place now than it has been in a long time.21
Yet the mythology of crime in New York seems to transcend the
truth. Consequently, a bunker mentality persists among longtime
denizens of the city, who cling to a grim image of their own commu
nity that they could, if they would, relinquish.
With fear of crime - rather than facts about crime - dominat
ing the debate, the legislative landscape is littered with minimum
mandatory sentencing provisions,22 "three strikes" statutes,23 modi
fications of the juvenile justice system to allow youthful offenders
to be tried as adults and sentenced to adult correctional facilities,24
reintroduction of the death penalty or broadening of its reach,25
and crusades to diminish the quality of inmate life.26 Recordcrime on the three major network television news shows tripled from 571 stories in 1991 to
1,632 stories in 1993 - despite the fact that crime declined slightly over that period" (citing
1993
The Year in Review, MEDIA MONITOR Jan.-Feb. 1994)).
19. See generally PHILIP SCHLESINGER & HowARD TUMBER, REPORTING CRIME: THE
MEDIA PoLmcs OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 184 (1994) (quoting DoRis GRABER, CRIME Nsws
AND THE Puauc 39 (1980) ("[An] exaggerated picture is presented of the incidence of the
most violent kinds of crime, while the incidence of lesser crimes is minimized[.]"); THE REAL
WAR ON CRIME, supra note 18, at 71 ("Newspapers also tend to present a distorted view by
focusing most of their attention on sensational crimes rather than the vastly more numerous
nonviolent offenses.").
20. The proliferation of "real life" entertainment television programs like America's Most
Wanted and Unsolved Mysteries, as well as the emphasis on unsolved violent crimes in televi
sion magazine programs like 60 Minutes, 20120, and Hard Copy fuels this misperception. See
THE REAL WAR ON CRIME, supra note 18, at 70 (noting that one scholar has coined the term
"mean world" syndrome "to describe how heavy viewers of television violence increasingly
feel that their own lives are under siege."), citing George Gerbner, Television Violence: The
Art of Asking the Wrong Question, CURRENTS IN MoosRN THOUGHT at 396, July, 1994.
21. See Glaberson, supra note 2.
22. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.A. § 841 et seq. (minimum mandatory for cocaine and crack
possession).
23. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL Coos § 667(e)(2)(A) (West 1997 Supp.) (providing an "indeter
minate term of life imprisonment" for convicted offenders with two previous convictions for
serious violent felonies).
24. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 119, § 6 (1990) (requiring certain offenses committed
by juveniles to be tried in the adult system).
25. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 7, 1995, ch.1, § 2, 1995 N.Y. Laws 1 (reinstating death penalty in
New York as of September 1, 1995); Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1795 (1994 Crime Bill) (adding 23 new offenses for which
the death penalty may be imposed including espionage, racketeering, and carjacking).
26. See, e.g., Neal R. Pierce, Dos and Don'ts for Saner Prisons, 28 NATL. J. 1653 (Aug. 3,
1996) (quoting former Massachusetts Governor William Weld for his view that prisons
should be "a tour through the circles of hell").
-
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breaking percentages of people - particularly men of color - are
behind bars,21 and prison construction projects have exploded.28
The political rhetoric that propels these initiatives is bipartisan.

In the judicial branch, these same forces produced New York
Judge Harold Rothwax, who toured the radio call-in show circuit to
promote Guilty: The Collapse of Criminal Justice, a book that
boasts of his conversion from a civil libertarian and defense attor
ney to an angry conservative disgusted by both criminal defendants
and the attorneys who represent them. The book brims with right
eousness and fury, unabashedly condemning all defendants29 as
well as their counsel.30 While it enjoyed a great deal of attention in
27. See THE REAL WAR ON CruME, supra note 18, at 101-03 (noting that African
American men are incarcerated at a rate six times that of white men, although they make up
less than seven percent of the population, and that, in 1994, one out of every three African
American men between the ages of 20 and 29 in the entire country was under some form of
criminal justice supervision (citing MARc MAUER, AMERICANS BEHIND BARS: THE INTER
NATIONAL UsE oF INCARCERATION, 1992-1993 (Sept. 1994); MARc MAUER & TRACY HUL
ING, YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: FIVE YEARS LATER
(Oct. 1995))).
28. See THE EDNA McCoNNELL CLARK FoUND., AMERICANS BEHIND BARS 5 (1992)
(reporting that "[i]n fiscal 1989, $6.7 billion was spent on the construction of new prison
space across the country, a 73 percent rise over the previous year," that this construction
"increased state and federal capacity by 128,000 beds," and that New York State opened 27
new prisons between 1983 and 1990 (citing Corrections Compendium)).
29. In a defining anecdote, Judge Rothwax tells of a conversation he had with his mother
early in his career as a lawyer:
When I was a fresh, young defense attorney, one of my first cases was a man who was
charged with robbery. I took my job as his advocate very seriously. During that period,
I was visiting my mother and I proudly told her, "I'm representing a man accused of
robbery."
She frowned. "What did he do?"
"He's charged with robbing an old man coming home from a store," I told her.
She looked at me with horror, and I could see the pride in her son the lawyer quickly
slipping away. "How can you represent a man like that?"
I explained patiently. "Well, Mom, he tells me he's not guilty."
My mother gazed at me pityingly, as though I was the most naive creature on earth,
and said with a sigh, "Son, if he can rob, he can lie."
I often think of my mother's words on that day. They serve as my reminder, a tickler
to my conscience. Even the most sacred idea is open to scrutiny. And even as we search
for truth, we all too often give credence to a lie.
RoTiiWAX, supra note 4, at 34.
30. Judge Rothwax argues, "There are many places we can look for a cure to the out-of
control adversary system. But perhaps the best place to start is with a serious reevaluation of
the role of the defense attorney." Id. at 139. His premise is that "[s]adly, the culture that the
defense lawyer inhabits today is one that says it's okay to push the envelope, to brush against
the ethical barrier and occasionally slip over." Id. at 130. In one of his less vitriolic passages,
Judge Rothwax observes that:
Given the probability that the defendant is guilty, the defense attorney knows that
the defendant will win only if counsel is successful in preventing the truth from being
disclosed - or, failing that, misleading the jury once it is disclosed. So, when the de
fendant is guilty, the defense attorney's role is to prevent, distort, and mislead.
Id. at 141 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 135 (claiming that defendants, most of whom
are guilty, are "yearning neither for an accurate reconstruction of the facts nor for an error
free trial").
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the popular press,31 it was dismissed by legal scholars and jurists as
"lopsided,"32 and a "jeremiad."33
With Virtual Justice, Uviller takes Judge Rothwax's populist
theme into the academic setting, couching in disarmingly bland
prose the same radical thesis: that many of the rules of criminal
procedure that have evolved through the last thirty years of consti
tutional adjudication hamper law enforcement excessively and
should be curtailed or repealed. Despite the fact that Uviller has
buffed up Judge Rothwax's a,rguments with some sane discussion
and occasional nods to the counterargument, he ends up right
where Rothwax started. The Collapse of Criminal Justice and The
Flawed Prosecution of Crime in America pander to the same fears
and exploit the same distorted perceptions. The surprise is that
Uviller's sugar coated version of Rothwax's tirade is much harder
to swallow.
I. NYPD

BLUES:

A PLEA FOR MORE POLICE DISCRETION

Uviller's major point is that the Supreme Court's readings of the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments are not justified. According
to Uviller, "the continuous struggle between effective illegality and
the blunter but prouder tactics of lawful law enforcement" (p. 109)
has been wrongly resolved:
Though the Constitution was certainly drafted with the common-law
model in mind, the fundamental catalogue of rights and obligations
that found their way into the text do not require the full adversary
mode that we have engrafted onto it. The citizen can be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures with far greater scope for
court-sanctioned investigations. Our ingrained notions of the limits of
interrogation and the consequences of silence are not dictated by the
words of the Fifth Amendment that none shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself. And certainly the right to the assistance of
counsel in one's defense does not necessitate the adversary circus or
the lawyerly shield against the fair acquisition of evidence against the
accused defendant. [pp. 309-10]

To prove his point, Uviller examines the criminal process in the
conventional arrest-to-trial sequence, using a "modest collection of
tales" that are fictional but, he says, not "altogether fictitious" (p.
xv) to depict "common and perplexing events in the collection of
evidence and the trial of criminal cases" (p. xv) . He then applies his
long experience as a scholar and, more surreptitiously, as a prosecuat

31. See,
1, 4-6.

e.g., Bernard Gavzer, ls Justice Possible?, BOSTON GLOBE, July 26, 1996, Parade

See, e.g., id. at 6 (quoting Professor Yale Kamisar of the University of Michigan).
See, e.g., Sol Wachtler, Crime and Punishment, NEW YORKER, July 15, 1996, at 72, 74
(reviewing Guilty and other books on criminal justice, with passing reference to Virtual
Justice).
32.
33.
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tor, to tease out of the narratives an assortment of problems that,
he contends, produce a system of "virtual," rather than true,
justice.34
As a result of this choice of narrative structure, the book's tone
shifts awkwardly from the Mickey Spillane diction of the "tales" to
Uviller's own more ponderous analytic prose.35 Many of the fic
tional passages suggest a fascination with the gadgets and jargon of
police work - such as crownlights (p. 29) and bullhorns (p. 243),
"perps" (p. 58), "mopes," and "The Job"36 - that is especially dis
cordant with the tone of mastery that dominates the remainder of
the book. While Uviller plainly strives for diversity among his fic
tional characters, with male and female police officers, prosecutors,
and judges, he often slips into hackneyed stereotypes of gender and
34. While acknowledging the "congruence" between the "virtual justice" produced by the
system and the "true justice" for which the system strives, Uviller notes:
But I also know that there are elements in the process - systemic flaws - that tend
to bend virtual justice without distorting its apparent correspondence to true justice. In
places, law fails the needs of the investigators, of the lawyers, of the fact finders; at
. critical junctures action is improvised and adversary confrontations cast the players in
roles that do not enhance the reliability of the synthesis. It is these aspects of the pro
cess on which I will focus. Here, perhaps, we may see whether the virtual justice gener
ated by the adversary system has an acceptably close correspondence to the true justice
that our collective libido demands.
P. xiv.
Uviller's conception of justice as a response to libidinous demands perhaps explains the
irrationality of many of his criticisms as well as his proposed solutions.
35. I am not the first to observe that Uviller strives for authenticity by emulating the hard
boiled prose of writers like Mickey Spillane. See Book Note, The Eyes of the Law, 103
HARV. L. REv. 1390, 1392 (1990) (describing Tempered Zea� Uviller's earlier book, as
"[s]ounding more like Mickey Spillane than Clifford Geertz"). The comparison stems from
Uviller's rather self-conscious use of "street" language like this:
Detective Bailey reaches over, slips the photo out of the book, and reads the infor
mation on the back. So far so good, she thinks. At least it doesn't rule him out. Not like
the victim we had in here last week who described a perp as six-four, maybe five, then
ID'd a shot of a mope five-eight. Or the vie last month who made a positive on a heavy
hitter who was doing four-to-eight at the time the crime went down.
P. 41. In addition, like Spillane's, Uviller's fictional passages often rely upon cliche, like "the
unfinished donut," p. 15, and extremely mannered diction, like "Lauren hijacked Mike's cup,
took a sip of bad coffee, cold now," p. 101.
These narratives contrast abruptly with Uviller's own authoritative, and at times even
patronizing, voice:

In the pages ahead, I shall conduct a short tour of this bedeviled edifice. . . . Perhaps
an odd, habitual turn of the legal mind will be amusing, perhaps an unsuspected doctri
nal wrinkle will raise a casual eyebrow. Harmless sport. Disappointing, perhaps, to
some who seek more aggressive co=entary. But it is my prime purpose merely to
engage, to reveal, and to share some of the wonder I feel as I wander through these
familiar premises.
Pp. xiv-xv.
36. P. 42. This fascination perhaps has its roots in Uviller's sabbatical experiences "rid
ing" with a division of the NYPD, and documented in a previous book. See H. RICHARD
UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL: A COLUMBIA LAW PROFESSOR'S YEAR ON THE STREETS WITH
THE NEw Yoruc CITY PouCE (1980). Virtual Justice does not refer to this experience.
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ethnicity.37 All of this makes it somewhat difficult to take the seri
ous stuff seriously.
Although it appears from the opening chapter, "Overview of the
Criminal Justice System," that Virtual Justice is written for an audi
ence of readers who have not received a legal education, much of
the detail would seem to hold little interest for anyone but law
yers.38 Conversely, however, the book is too simplistic for most
lawyers.39 Consequently, it occupies an intermediate zone in which
it is both too sophisticated for some and too superficial for others.
In addition, many of the problems to which Uviller applies his
two narrative voices are so esoteric that they merit neither the
overly stylized "tales"40 he develops in order to frame them nor the
lengthy exegeses he then supplies. For example, Uviller's first issue
- the difficulty police face when seeking a warrant to search a
murder scene if the premises on which the body is found are not
those of the victim - can hardly be said to have a significant im
pact on the "prosecution of crime in America," as his title promises.
He describes the issue as a "genuine legal hole" (p. 24) formed by
the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment's warrants
clause41 and the impossibility, in his view, of knowing in advance of
37. In one "tale," he writes that "Katherine was swept off her feet by Manuel's legendary
Latin ardor." P. 200. In another, he presents a gay character, Bruce, whose "earliest mem·
ory was the time his father had discovered a doll that Bruce had found in the attic and liked
secretly to dress up and play with in his room." Pp. 271-72. Uviller appears to attribute
Bruce's sexual orientation to this episode, in which his father "murder[s]" the "baby," "vi
ciously slamming its sweet bewigged head against the wall until it br[eaks]." P. 272. Later in
the narrative, Bruce's longing for his father's approval drives him to join the Marines. P. 272.
38. For example, in chapter 11, Uviller strives at length to explain the nuances of rules
relating to admissibility of character and conduct evidence, and the risk that exceptions Ian·
guage might swallow the rule against propensity evidence.
39. See, e.g., p. 261 {"In recent years, urged by the women's movement, psychologists
have studied cases of women who eventually strike back after being viciously abused by their
partners over an extended period. From these clinical studies, they have crafted what is now
called the 'battered-spouse syndrome."'). In addition, as this example illustrates, Uviller
often presents well-settled concepts as recent developments.
40. Uviller emphatically denies that these tales are "artificial - the sort of hypothetical
puzzles that generations of law students have grappled with in classrooms, never to encoun
ter again." P. xv. Despite this disclaimer, I think he would be hard-pressed to demonstrate
that many of the tales are, as he insists, "true to life." P. xv. The Arab-American police
officer working undercover to infiltrate the "Islamic Friendship Federation," who, the district
attorney fears, "may be going over," p. 161, is one such unlikely tale.
41. U.S. CoNST. amend. IV ("[N]o warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, sup
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.").
Uviller attributes this "legal hole" to the decision of the Supreme Court in Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), in which it declined to recognize an exception to the warrant
requirement for crime scene searches. Although Uviller explicates the decision in Mincey, he
does so without noting that the 1978 decision was unanimous on this point, and that it refuted
Uviller's position regarding crime-scene searches and, more generally, the needs of law en
forcement, by restating the follO\ving fundamental principle:
Moreover, the mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never
by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment. The investigation of crime would
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a search "what particular item of evidence might be found on the
scene" (p. 24). Despite qualifications - he notes that "[i]t is . . .
difficult to say how often warrants are sought for crime scene
searches and with what results"42 and that "[o]nly those whose se
curity was invaded and against whom the evidence is offered have
standing to exclude it" (p. 24) - Uviller nevertheless selects that
single issue to epitomize his first chapter heading, "Virtual Legality
in the Field" (p. 13).
This somewhat arcane problem becomes the vehicle for Uviller
to advocate a radical expansion of police power. He proposes stat
utory authorization for judges to issue warrants to search "the scene
of a recent crime of a certain level of gravity - perhaps named
crimes like homicide, rape, arson, kidnapping" and to allow for the
seizure of evidence "notwithstanding the inability of the police to
particularly describe in advance the evidence they are looking for
or to give any specific reason to think they will find it" (pp. 24-25).
This proposal sounds very much like a general warrant,43 a practice
that Uviller concedes was "a primary abuse by the colonial police
- one of the precipitating causes of the revolution, some say."44
Yet, as throughout Virtual Justice, Uviller urges this result-oriented
always be simplified if warrants were unnecessary. But the Fourth Amendment reflects
the view of those who wrote the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a person's home and
property may not be totally sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity in enforce
ment of the criminal law.
Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393 (citation omitted). Certainly, one might critique the position implicit
in Mincey that no search or seizure may take place except pursuant to a warrant as lacking
historical or textual support, see, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMI
NAL PROCEDURE: FmST PRINCIPLES 4 (1997) (characterizing the Mincey rule as a "per se"
approach to the Fourth Amendment that is plainly contradicted by a variety of historical
sources), but Uviller does not bother to do so. Instead, he simply announces that the rule
should be abrogated because it impairs law enforcement.
42. Pp. 26-27. There is nothing in Virtual Justice to suggest that Uviller attempted to
gather such information. Moreover, Uviller offers no estimate of the frequency of the "legal
hole" created when the premises to be searched are those as to whom the particularity re
quirement cannot be satisfied.
43. See Wtlkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (P.C. 1763) (British decision declaring general
warrants unconstitutional); 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JoHN ADAMS 134-44, 142 (L. Kihvin Wroth
& Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965) (explaining why writs of assistance, a kind of general warrant,
were illegal, including that "A man's house is his castle; and while he is quiet, he is as well
guarded as a prince in his castle. This writ, if it should be declared legal, would totally annihi
late this privilege."); Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 197, 224-26 (1993) (explaining one basis of the opposition of James Otis,
Jr., to general warrants - that they could be issued to a customs officer who could search all
private citizens' homes or businesses without judicial oversight or accountability for the life
of the warrant).
44. P. 23. Again, reasonable minds might differ on whether it was the specter of a general
warrant that produced the language of the Fourth Amendment, see generally Carol S.
Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REv. 820, 822-24 (1994) (cit
ing examples of debate on the historical evidence of the Fourth Amendment's meaning), or
whether, instead, the Warrant Clause was adopted not to "reassure[ ] a search target" but to
"bar[ ] a target from suing after the fact," AMAR, supra note 41, at 15. But Uviller ought to
give· some critical context for the proposals that he offers on so fundamental a point as this.
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curtailment of a core civil liberty to free law enforcement from
what he views as cumbersome and unnecessary technicalities, while
offering very little legal or empirical support for the change.45
Uviller suggests that his statute ought to be defensible as a vari
ation on an inspection warrant,46 even while confessing the critical
distinction: the inspection warrant has an administrative purpose
while his crime scene warrant is all about finding evidence of a
crime to be used to prosecute an individual.47 His reasoning be
comes increasingly sloppy once the issue is joined; as the chapter
draws to a close, he pleads, "Still, it does seem reasonable, doesn't
it? And reasonability, remember, is at the heart of the Fourth
Amendment . . . . "48
As the book progresses, Uviller becomes more bold and ex
pands his suggestion from the relatively infrequent context of crime
scene searches to the far broader assertion that law enforcement
agencies ought to be authorized to conduct door-to-door searches
for firearms under this same rubric of administrative inspections.
Noting only that the statute authorizing such a power "would have
to be meticulously fair and even-handed" (p. 105), he pays mere lip
service to the concerns that such a radical expansion of police
power provokes. Acknowledging that "[a]ggressive police patrol
carries an unmistakable whiff of fascism," he then brushes this con
cern aside with conclusory ease: "Believing as I do, it's hard to
deny that the program is compatible with basic values of our soci
ety" (p. 108). Instead, Uviller unconvincingly repeats his refrain
that "the key concept in the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness
. . . a flexible idea [that] should take account of the urgency of social
necessity as well as the unavailability of lesser intrusions to accom
plish the purpose. "49
This sequence is repeated in succeeding chapters, as Uviller cat
alogs a series of problems he sees in the criminal system, without
45. Uviller makes no effort, for example, to root the "crime scene" approach to searches
,in any source of authority, either textual or precedential. His "solution," it seems, is not so
much to be applauded for its creativity as closely scrutinized for its anomaly.
46.

See

Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).

47. Uviller ignores this distinction in his suggestion that Camara supports his proposal.
Compare p. 26 ("My argument, I must confess, is not quite as neat as it appears. These
inspection searches - along with their warrantless siblings, the 'inventory searches' . . . are frequently justified by their administrative aspect, a benign purpose compared with law
enforcement objectives.") with Camara, 387 U.S. at 530 {"Since the inspector does not ask
that the property owner open his doors to a search for 'evidence of criminal action' which
may be used to secure the owner's criminal conviction, historic interests of 'self-protection'
jointly protected by the Fourth and Ftfth Amendments are said not to be involved, but only
the less intense 'right to be secure from intrusion into personal privacy."' (footnote
omitted)).
48. P. 26. The remainder of the sentence quotes the Amendment in full.
49. P. 105. Uviller offers no proof that a lesser intrusion - like a warrant based on
probable cause - is unavailable.
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attempting to substantiate them. He does not show that these
problems occur with a frequency that matters, but instead charac
terizes them as grave enough not only to warrant his and our atten
tion, but also to justify significant changes in criminal procedure.
He laments the "inescapable conundrum" (p. 50) that an equivocal
photo identification from a book of mug shots - "I can't be sure.
The guy who robbed me looked meaner, angrier, you know what I
mean? But it could be him" (p. 41) - coupled with a second wit
ness's equivocal statement that the suspect "could be one of the
[people in a photo array] but I really can't say for sure" (p. 42),
does not amount to probable cause to arrest an individual and com
pel him to appear in a lineup. The "problem" in this scenario, as
Uviller sees it, is that the police do not get to arrest the person that
they have determined - or, more accurately, predetermined, given
that there is insufficient evidence for arrest - must have commit
ted the crime.
Once again, the remedy is far more dangerous than the illness:
Uviller recommends adoption of a "Non-testimonial Identification"
amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a solution
he attributes to " [s]ome unsung hero" of "more than twenty years
ago" (p. 51), whereby "probable cause" would be watered down to
''reasonable grounds" when police seek authorization to order an
individual to appear in a lineup or to provide other nontestimonial
evidence such as fingerprints, blood, and urine (p. 51). Uviller does
not even consider the potential impact of this enhanced police
power on citizens, let alone offer any analysis of competing rights
and interests.50 Instead, he masks the significance of the change he
proposes by describing it as "[n]eat, simple, and - as far as I can
see - perfectly constitutional" (p. 51).
The danger of Virtual Justice is in such glibness. Unlike
Rothwax, who boldly announces his contempt for the criminal de
fendant and considers it a virtue that his reform proposals will have
painful costs for that constituency,51 Uviller dissembles, presenting
controversial proposals as obvious boons and exploiting the tone of
the scholar to disguise his bias as wisdom.
Like his colleagues Judge Rothwax and Professor Fletcher,
Uviller is also highly critical of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for
Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations.52 In the Fourth Amend50. I use the term "interests" rather than "rights" to avoid the circularity of defining the
contours of the Fourth Amendment "right" by reference to the standard of probable cause.
More important, I think it is crucial to reject the subtle distortion implicit in the use of the
term "rights" to describe the power exercised by law enforcement and other governmental
authorities.
51.

See RoTiiWAX, supra note 4, passim.

52. Pp. 69-70. Uviller, like Rothwax, advocates a rule of judicial discretion rather than
the automatic remedy of the exclusionary rule. Pretending to ambivalence at first, he con-

1446

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 96:1435

ment context, he characterizes it as a "baroque minuet" (p. 80) ,
"that ugly old monster" (p. 86), and a rule that causes us to "suffer
the anomaly of lost prosecutions of guilty criminals in order to pro
tect people against unreasonable invasions of security" (p. 85). Yet
again he offers almost nothing to support his contention. Certainly,
much is available in legal literature as to the empirical evidence of
the exclusionary rule's cost, even if that evidence's significance is
debated.53 Instead, he announces in conclusory fashion that the ex
clusionary rule is "the prime distortion factor in criminal verdicts,
the gunk that clogs the court docket" (p. 86). Would his recommen
dations about the rule differ, one wonders, if he were aware that in
one four-year period, the Second Circuit did not affirm a single sup
pression order?54

II. WHAT'S

GOING ON: POLICE PRACTICES IN
IN THE 1990s

NEW yORK CITY

Uviller's uncritical depiction of law enforcement is particularly
surprising for a number of reasons. Prior to Virtual Justice, Uviller
wrote Tempered Zeal, 55 an account of his experiences during a sab
batical with the New York City Police Department. Tempered Zeal
not only acknowledged, but also expressed concern about, the fre
quency of police perjury with respect to Fourth Amendment issues
such as warrants and searches. He described the "most common
form of police perjury" as "the instrumental adjustment, " which he
defined as "[a] slight alteration in the facts to accommodate an un
wieldy constitutional constraint and obtain a just result. "56 As Uvil
ler explained:
[C]ops may insert a little invention to fortify the probable cause upon
which a fruitful search was predicated. Add a small but deft stroke to
eludes that "on balance, I trust judges. I do not believe that the exercise of judicial discretion
is a roll of the dice. And I think that the solution to the perplexing dilemma is probably in
resort to good sense and an educated decision on whether exclusion is appropriate in all the
complex circumstances of the particular case." P. 70.
53. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw.
U. L. REv. 387 (1996) (evaluating several empirical studies calculating the impact of Miranda
in eleven American cities as well as Britain and Canada); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's
Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REv.
500 (1996) (responding to Cassell); Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illu
sion of Miranda's Defenders, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1084 (1996) (responding to Schulhofer).
54. See Gerald B. Lefcourt, Responsibilities ofa Criminal Defense Attorney, 30 LoY. L.A.
L. REv. 59, 64-65 (1996). As it happens, Uviller's recommendation - more frequent use of
radio hookups between officers in the field and judges and magistrates with the authority to
approve a warrant application - is hardly the "godsend" or the "beautiful deliverance," p.
85, that he congratulates himself for proposing. Predicated as it is on another unproven con
clusion - that "[t]he prime reason police do not go to court before they enter secure spaces
is logistical. It's a hassle," p. 84 - Uviller's hyperbole only underscores the superficiality of
the solution.
55. See Uv1LLER, supra note 36.
56. Id. at 115-16 (emphasis in original).
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the facts - say, a visible bulge at the waistband of a person carrying a
pistol. Just enough to put some flesh on the hunch that actually in
duced the officer to give the man a toss; it might make all the differ
ence. Or a police officer, understandably eager to have the jury hear
the bad guy's full and free confession, might advance slightly the mo
ment at which the Miranda warnings were recited to satisfy the
courts' insistence that they precede the very first question in a course
of interrogation. That sort of thing. Although no one admitted it to
me in so many words, I think most police officers regard such altera
tions of events as the natural and inevitable outgrowth of artificial
and unrealistic post facto judgments that release criminals.57
Given these observations, it is surprising that Uviller never puts two
and two together: reducing probable cause to reasonable cause,
coupled with the frequent "invention" that "fortif[ies]" probable
cause, means a dramatic double reduction in the standard of proof
for investigatory arrests - once in the word and once in the deed.
What Uviller describes as a "hunch" beefed up by an "instrumental
adjustment" is, under his proposal, watered down still further. At
what level do we then find ourselves: bias?5S
In the eight years since Tempered Zeal, the issue of perjury
among police, particularly New York City's officers, has received
extraordinary scrutiny, and the evidence available to Uviller and
others clearly demonstrates that the problem he not only acknowl
edged, but purported to justify, has only been exacerbated. The
1994 report of the Mollen Commission, charged with investigating
allegations of police misconduct in New York City, presented a dis
turbing picture of police perjury that was so pervasive that the term
"testilying" was coined to describe it.59 The Commission reported
57. Id. at 116. Uviller dares to defend police perjury by distinguishing between "[p]erjury
that creates artificial evidence" and thereby "distorts the data being considered by the jury,"
on the one hand, and "lies that result in a more complete picture of the events on trial." He
actually applauds this latter category of perjury as "contribut[ing] to the accuracy of the
verdict" Id. at 117.
58. Most disturbing is the prospect of illegitimate factors, like race and class, assuming an
even greater role in the exercise of discretion by law enforcement officials than they do under
present constitutional standards. Racism already forms an all-too-common basis for the
"hunches" that Uviller celebrated in Tempered ZeaL See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, Benign Ne
glect ofRacism in the Criminal Justice System, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1660, 1661 n.5 (book review)
(citing cases in which courts have approved use of race as a factor in exercise of police discre
tion); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214
(1983); Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters" - Some Preliminary Thoughts About
Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Mauer?, 26 VAL. U. L. REv. 243 (1991).
There are certainly sufficient examples in the popular press of this kind of law enforce
ment, from Mark Fuhrman's braggadocio in the OJ. Simpson case to the manipulations of
racism by Susan Smith and Charles Stuart. The recent controversy surrounding U.S. District
Judge Baer's suppression of evidence in a drug case in the southern district of New York
stemmed in part from his express acknowledgment of what more often lurks beneath the
surface of many, if not all, criminal proceedings: that people of color have qualitatively dif
ferent expectations of and experiences with law enforcement. See infra notes 75-76.
59. See REPORT OF THE CoMMisSION TO !NvEsTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE COR
RUPTION AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT 36 (1994)
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on such practices as "turnover arrests,"60 "collars for dollars,"61 and
other forms of systematic perjury.62 The prosecutors who work
with these officers demonstrated a level of knowledge that amounts
to complicity: as one anonymous Manhattan A.D.A. noted, "No
one looks down on it. . . . Taking money is considered dirty, but
perjury for the sake of an arrest is accepted. It's become more cas
ual. And the civil libertarians have no effective response to it. It's
almost an intractable problem."63
During this same period in which Uviller bewailed the increased
burden that current rules of criminal procedure have imposed on
law enforcement, the New York City Police Department was ripped
apart by a succession of scandals in precincts in the Bronx,64 Man
hattan,65 Brooklyn,66 and Queens,67 involving an estimated 300 of
ficers68 who used their status as police systematically to rob, beat,
(Milton Mollen, Chair) [hereinafter Mollen Commission Report] ("Several officers also told
us that the practice of police falsification in connection with such arrests is so common in
certain precincts that it has spawned its own word: 'testilying"'); see also Joe Sexton, New
York Police Often Lie Under Oath, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1994, at Al [hereinaf
ter Sexton, Police Often Lie] (noting that "the commission 'was told of officers up to the rank
of captain being actively complicit in and even encouraging warrantless searches and subse
quent perjury"'); Joe Sexton, Types ofPerjury Common Among Police Officers Are Detailed,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1994, at A27 [hereinafter Sexton, Types of Perjury].
60. Sexton, Types of Perjury, supra note 59 ("A police officer arrests a suspect but has
plans for the weekend and doesn't want to spend the next day in court. So he asks his part
ner not only to take credit for the arrest, but to take the witness stand in front of the grand
jury as well.").
61. Clifford Krauss, Corruption in Uniform: The Overview: 2-Year Corruption Inquiry
Finds a "Willful Blindness" in New York's Police Department, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1994, at Al
("[I]n a practice called 'collars for dollars,' officers sometimes took short cuts to make more
arrests to earn more overtime and earn promotions to coveted assignments.").
62. See id. ("The commission also found that officers who were otherwise doing their jobs
to fight crime falsified records often to obtain convictions. It noted that while street narcotics
enforcement units are prohibited from entering buildings to make arrests, members of such
squads typically falsified papers to make arrests that actually occurred indoors appear as
though they were made on the street.").
63. Sexton, Types ofPerjury, supra note 59, at 28; see also Sexton, Police Often Lie, supra
note 59 (reporting that Brooklyn's district attorney himself acknowledged that "police of
ficers often tried to get around the problem of needing probable cause" by lying about the
events surrounding an arrest); infra at n. 82 (comparing the ethical roles of prosecutors and
defense counsel with respect to perjurious witnesses).
64. See Adam Nossiter, Two Officers Convicted in 30th Precinct, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7,
1996, at B3 (reporting that "[m]ore than a sixth, or 33, of the officers from the 30th Precinct
[in the Bronx] were arrested . . . on charges ranging from perjury to stealing drugs, cash and
guns").
65. See Clifford Krauss, Bratton Says Corruption Sweep Involves Dozens More Officers,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1994, at Al.
66. See Joseph P. Fried, Officer Arrested in Inquiry of 73d Precinct, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30,
1994, at B3 (describing a "rogue band" of about a dozen officers in the 73rd Precinct in
Brooklyn who conducted "hundreds of illegal raids in the Brownsville area").
67. See Clifford Krauss, 3 from Queens Precinct Indicted in Theft of $I,400 from Man,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1995, at B3.
68. See Robert D. McFadden, Three More in Precinct Are Accused, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7,
1995, at Bl.
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and harass citizens. The Mollen Commission described "well or
ganized police 'crews' terrorizing minority neighborhoods" and
noted that they were "more akin to street gangs: small, loyal, flexi
ble, fast-moving and often hard hitting."69 They engaged in a prac
tice cryptically referred to as "doing doors" - "illegally raiding
drug dens for plunder"70 - and routinely used "sapgloves" - lead
lined gloves - and heavy flashlights to assault men, women, and
teenagers that they encountered during these raids.71
Moreover, since the publication of Virtual Justice; New Yorkers
witnessed an episode of police brutality that was as shocking for its
cruelty as for its suggestion that at least some police officers believe
they are free to act with complete impunity. The officer charged
with shoving a wooden rod into the rectum and then the mouth of
Abner Louima is alleged to have borrowed a pair of gloves from a
colleague in the public lobby of the stationhouse, stripped Louima
from the waist down in that public lobby, and then taken him in
handcuffs to the bathroom where he committed the assault. After
the attack, the officer is alleged to have led Louima to the holding
cell with his pants around his ankles and to have then walked
through the stationhouse hallway brandishing the stick.72 In the pe
riod following disclosure of the assault, many observers suggested
that Mayor Giuliani's law enforcement policies had created that cli
mate of perceived impunity.13
While Uviller did not focus his book on these extraordinary epi
sodes of corruption, his anxiety that law enforcement is inade
quately equipped to address the problem of crime is significantly
undermined by their existence. The anxiety, it would seem, is bet
ter suited to the prospect of these same officers enjoying a broader
range of discretion and authority. Quite simply, it is a problem of
credibility for Uviller to have omitted all reference to these contem
poraneous developments.
69. Corruption in Uniform: Excerpts from What the Commission Found: Loyalty over
Integrity, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1994, at B2.
70. Selwyn Raab,
1993, at A38.

Similarities in Inquiries into Crimes by Officers, N.Y.

TIMES, Oct. 3,

71. See Selwyn Raab, Detailing Burglars in Blue: Violent Search for Booty, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 1993, at B3 (quoting one ex-officer's testimony before the Mollen Commission that
he participated in five raids per day, that he used to "tune people up," a "police word for
beating people up," that "his sergeant encouraged him and two other rookies to assault
everyone found in suspected drug-trafficking locations," and that he did not fear arrest or
dismissal because of these activities because "[w]ho's going to catch us? We're the police.
We're in charge.").

72. See Dan Barry,
19, 1997, at Al.

Two More Officers Held in Attack on Haitian Man, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.

73. See Dan Barry, Charges of Brutality: The Overview: Leaders of Precinct Are Swept
Out in Torture Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1997, at Al.
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Uviller also fails to address an ancillary, and perhaps more in
sidious, problem that arises from police abuse: judicial tolerance of
these practices. The heated public controversy surrounding the de
cision of U.S. District Judge Baer to suppress evidence seized by
New York City police officers from the automobile of an African
American woman on a Washington Heights street demonstrates
how pliant even life-tenured judges can be in the face of public and
political pressure about crime.74 Judge Baer initially found, based
in significant part upon the officers' lack of credibility, that the po
lice lacked a reasonable suspicion that the defendant's car was in
volved in criminal activity at the time of the stop.75 He
subsequently reversed himself, credited the testimony of the police,
and rejected that of the defendant.76 Additional examples of judi
cial capitulation to anticrime rhetoric and prosecutorial pressures
have surfaced nationwide.77 Uviller does not address the impact
74. See Linda Greenhouse, Rehnquist Joins Fray on Rulings, Defending Judicial Indepen
dence, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1996, at Al (reporting that presidential candidate Bob Dole had
suggested during a campaign appearance that Judge Baer should be impeached for his ruling
and that Second Circuit Chief Judge Newman characterized the criticism as an "extraordi
nary intimidation").
75. See United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232, 239-40 {S.D.N.Y. 1996) {finding that
one officer's testimony "is at best suspect" and that he could not "keep from finding [the
officer's] story incredible" and also expressing concern that the other officer involved was
never called to testify although "presumably available to corroborate this officer's
gossamer").
In addition, Judge Baer observed that in light of the findings of the Mollen Commission
that permitted "residents in this neighborhood . . . to regard police officers as corrupt, abu
sive and violent," "had the men [alleged to have run at the sight of the officers] not run when
the cops began to stare at them, it would have been unusual." 913 F. Supp. at 242.
76. See United States v. Bayless, 921 F. Supp. 211, 216 {S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacating 913 F.
Supp. 232 {S.D.N.Y. 1996) {holding that defendant's "story is now less convincing" and that
"with more evidence and upon review, the Government's version is more credible").
Indeed, Judge Baer did not merely reverse himself but concluded his opinion with a
somewhat cloying apology and self-flagellation: "[u)nfortunately, the hyperbole {dicta) in my
initial decision not only obscured the true focus of my analysis, but regretfully may have
demeaned the law-abiding men and women who make Washington Heights their home and
the vast majority of the dedicated men and women in blue who patrol the streets of our great
City." 921 F. Supp. at 217. The passage stands in stark contrast to his earlier sense of being
"shatter[ed)" by the lack of security of people of color in their own communities, 913 F.
Supp. at 240, and his acid observation that "the same United States Attorney's Office which
brought this prosecution enjoyed more success in their prosecution of a corrupt police officer
of an anti-crime unit operating in this very neighborhood," 913 F. Supp. at 242.
77. See, e.g., Co=onwealth v. O'Brien, 673 N.E.2d 552 (Mass. 1996) (reversing a trial
court determination that a juvenile charged with homicide was amenable to rehabilitation
and should therefore be tried in juvenile rather than adult trial court); Judy Rakowsky, Judge
Dismissed from O'Brien Case, BosroN GLOBE, Mar. 4, 1997, at Al (reporting that supreme
judicial court, exercising "power of general superintendence," removed trial judge after re
versal to "eliminate controversies and unnecessary issues in further proceedings and in any
appeal").
Carol Steiker has noted that even if the judicial will to address flagrant police misconduct
existed, an array of procedural doctrines has either emerged or been greatly expanded that
has had the effect of precluding any relief. See Carol S. Steiker, Co11nter-Revol11tion in Con
stitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, 1ivo Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 246869 {1996).
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that reduced standards for police intervention might have when
conjoined with an increasingly superficial judicial review of police
conduct.
III.

EMPATHY AND CONTEMPT: THE ROLE OF
DEFENSE COUNSEL

Using similarly specious arguments to advocate radical reforms,
Uviller shows disgust and frustration with a number of other well
established rules of criminal procedure, such as the right to coun
sel78 and the right against self-incrimination.79 But he reserves his
78. Uviller's subheading for his chapter on this part of the criminal process says it all:
"Dramatic, Deceitful, and Dilatory Assistance." P. 132. Here he is arm·in·arm with Judge
Rothwax, see RoTIIWAX, supra note 4, at 79·82 (arguing that "interrogation and trial have
disparate goals" and that "straightforward questioning in a nonhostile, nonthreatening envi
ronment . . . [is] the very essence of respect"), advocating a limit on the assistance of counsel
that would keep counsel out of the investigatory phase of all criminal proceedings and allow
them a role only at the trial itself:
As we have seen, critical stages may occur outside the courtroom - at lineup identifica
tions, for example, and interviews with police or their covert agents at which some in
criminating admission may be elicited. But the core of the counsel clause (the true
meaning of the provision, some - like me - would argue) is the promise of profes
sional assistance at the most critical stage: courtroom proceedings.
Pp. 136-37; see also H. Richard Uviller, Evidence from the Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A
Reconsideration of the Current Rules ofAccess and Restraint, 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 1137, 1138
(1987) (characterizing the right to counsel as "the villain of the piece" and arguing that the
right to counsel has been misapplied as "an artificial device of cloture on government efforts
to obtain cognitive evidence").
Uviller ignores - or purposely avoids accounting for - the basic principle of trial advo
cacy holding that preparation in large part determines one's likelihood of success at trial.
Assistance in the courtroom only is too little too late. But see id. at 1169 (arguing that
"[m]ost" of the "critical" stages for purposes of the assistance of counsel "occur after the case
has crossed the courtroom threshold, of course, but some may arise during the investigatory
or preparatory stages").
In addition, Uviller does not account for the fact that the prosecution largely controls the
time of indictment and hence the time that the right to counsel attaches. See, e.g., United
States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1988) (declining to construe no-contact rule of
ethics as limited to the moment of indictment, because "[t]he timing of an indictment's return
lies substantially within the control of the prosecutor. . . . [who] could manipulate grand jury
proceedings to avoid its encumbrances").
79. Pp. 123-31. Again, Uviller here is in perfect harmony with Rothwax, see RoTIIWAX,
supra note 4, at 79 (criticizing Miranda's reasoning as "result[ing] in a system where we deny
people the opportunity to take responsibility for their criminal acts"), arguing, as did the
judge, that "[t]he social imperative that has been with us at least since people began to write
about social imperatives is that, along with their taxes, citizens owe the government a duty of
disclosure." P. 111. This position amounts to little more than an expression of frustration
with the drafters of the Fifth Amendment, which cannot more plainly state an abrogation of
this duty in the context of criminal proceedings. Cf. RoTIIWAX, supra note 4, at 230-31
("What would be so wrong with a system that requested a defendant to testify in a court of
law, on the record, and in the presence of his lawyers and the judge, after a showing of his
probable guilt had been demonstrated by the evidence?").
Uviller reveals his prosecutorial bias quite plainly at the chapter's end when, in response
to the proposition that either "[a]ll but spontaneous confessions could be banned . . . [o]r . . .
the moment of official accusation could be advanced to the point of arrest and the attached
right of counsel decreed unwaivable except in the presence of counsel," he states, "[l]ooking
boldly at the prospect of a law enforcement landscape stripped utterly of confession evi
dence, we cannot suppress a shudder." P. 130. He prophesies that if confessions are to be
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particular contempt for criminal defense attorneys, presumptuously
imagining a typical such lawyer and her attitudes toward her work
and her clients in a manner that demonstrates a profound unfamili
arity with those who do this work.80 He proudly declares that he
has
actually dared to take the question to several acquaintances in the
defense bar. "How can you do it?" I asked. "Case after case, year
after year. Putting your own integrity on the line for a clientele that
is, in the overwhelming proportion, guilty and ungrateful?" Most law
yers do not quarrel with the premise - at least those who know me
well enough to be candid.s1

I do quarrel with the premise, and I am not alone.s2
suppressed based upon Fifth or Sixth Amendment grounds, "[p]ublic anger would be so in
tense, [he] can see the return of the lynch mob." P. 130.
80. Pp. 280-82. Uviller's fictional public defender turned judge, Karen Meadows, follows
a trite trajectory from "[y]outhful idealism" that "inclined her to serve those she thought of
as 'victims of the system,"' to the discovery:
that something was happening to her attitude. And she didn't like it. It started when .
she noticed a new, urgent tone in her voice as she told her friends, wryly, as she had so
many times before, "I just wish I could have a client I like once in a while." It was not
that she had never had a client who just might be innocent. Even some of the guilty ones
had stories that could break your heart. But for the most part, her clients were indiffer
ent, suspicious, unrepentant, and ungrateful. And, Jet's face it, they were in the main the
predators of her community. Every now and then as Karen stood to challenge, discredit,
even humiliate a victim of her client's callous aggression, she asked herself, Why am I
doing this? There must be a better way to have fun while earning a living.
Pp. 280-81.
81. P. 151. As if this were not bad enough, Uviller then offers his own answer, underscor
ing his contempt with such trivializing justifications as "It's fun, " a category of rationale that
he describes as "All my life, I've wanted to sass a cop and get away with it. Now I do that
almost every day - and get paid for it!" P. 151.
Uvillers's tirade against defense counsel spans several chapters and contains such observed truths as:
The defense lawyer, born to the role, is a person who is more concerned with appear
ances and perceptions than with underlying facts; who puts greater reliance in "personal
ity" (including his or her own) than in knowledge; who has little concern for general
public disapprobation despite a high ego investment.
P. 153.
Perhaps as bad as these distortions are the arrogance and condescension that accompany
them. Uviller assures his readers that "I'm sorry, but I believe that in a calmer frame of mind
even [defense attorneys] will recognize the traits in themselves and colleagues." P. 153. He
observes, helpfully, that "[p]erhaps for this law professor, at least, the work of the defense
Bar in the adversary system would seem less reprehensible if so many did not feel called
upon, as a matter of diligence, to lie for their clients." P. 155.
Uviller attributes ego and "personality" only to defense counsel, and, worse, makes only
defense counsel responsible for the perjury of their witnesses. For him, prosecutors can do
no wrong. See infra note 82 (comparing ethical roles of prosecutor and defense counsel).
82. Like Rothwax, Uviller also embraces a remarkably lopsided vision of the respective
roles of prosecution and defense. He believes, inexplicably, that for prosecutors, "public
responsibility . . . is considerably broader than control. The prosecutor can do little, for
example, about police brutality or perjury." P. 158. For defense counsel, conversely, Uviller
proposes that "[s]urely, the lawyer should do more to discourage perjury" than raise a
"rather mild objection" to his client's story. P. 232. Rothwax similarly limited his criticism to
defense attorneys based upon his view that "[i]n a court of law, only the prosecution is as
signed the task of seeking the truth." RolliWAX, supra note 4, at 129. Why? Every lawyer is
responsible to the same extent for his or her own witnesses, and the rules of professional
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, The experience of those who practice as criminal defense attor
neys is far different from the cartoon that Uviller offers as incontro
vertible truth. Lawyers for those charged with crimes who face the
full weight of the state's power suffer not from a contempt for those
they represent, but rather from an overabundance of care that is
continually challenged by the many biases latent in the criminal jus
tice system. It is an excess of empathy, not the detachment that
Uviller supposes.s3
Charles Ogletree writes about this characteristic of the public
defender's relationship to his or her clients:
My relationships with clients were rarely limited to the provision of
conventional legal services. I did not draw rigid lines between my
professional practice and my private life. My relationship with my
. clients approximated a true friendship. I did for my clients all that I
would do for a friend. I took phone calls at all hours, helped clients
find jobs, and even interceded in domestic conflicts. I attended my
conduct in this area make no distinction that is contingent upon the lawyer's role at trial. See
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(4) (1995) (prohibiting "[a] lawyer"
from offering evidence "that the lawyer knows to be false").
Uviller further absolves the prosecution of responsibility for witness testimony by arguing
that "if (as is sometimes the case) the prosecutor simply does not know whether the identifi
cation her witness swears to is accurate . . . the prosecutor is entitled to bring the facts out
fairly and fully and let the jury decide." Pp. 192-93. Uviller's views on the respective roles of
prosecution and defense echo those of Justice White in his partial dissent in United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256-57 (1967), which is so lopsided as now to be deemed reversible error
if read to a jury. See, e.g., Bardonner v. State, 587 N.E.2d 1353, 1358-61 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)
(reading Wade language during voir dire "not only negates the defendant's presumption of
innocence, but also runs afoul of [the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct]"). Compare p.
232 ("[T]he prosecutor is obliged to refuse to call witnesses believed to be false and to dis
miss charges against a defendant believed to be innocent. Defense counsel is not charged
with any public responsibility to the truth.") with Wade, 388 lT.S. at 256 (White, J., dissenting)
("Law enforcement officers . . . must be dedicated to making the criminal trial a procedure
for the ascertainment of the true facts surrounding the commission of [a] crime. . . . But
defense counsel has no comparable obligation to ascertain or present the truth."). Why is
there no comparable entitlement on the part of defense counsel to be uncertain, and to pres
ent to the factfinder evidence that he or she does not "know" to be false? See infra text
accompanying notes 83-86.
83. See, e.g., Michael J. Lightfoot, On a Level Playing Field, 30 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 69, 73,
78 (1996) (criticizing the "one-sidedness" of the criminal system and noting that "young
[criminal defense] lawyers learn after a short while that, for many clients, there is little they
can do to achieve results that seem to be objectively rational and fair. The sense of hopeless
ness can become overwhelming to the point that it compromises the lawyer's dignity"); Lef
court, supra note 54, at 61-62 ("Representing an innocent client is an easy situation for the
public to support. In practice it is the hardest because of the overwhelming fear of loss.").
Even James S. Kunen, author of "How Can You Defend Those People?": The Making of
a Criminal Lawyer and a harsh critic of his criminal experiences, described feelings of empa
thy during his experience at the Public Defender Service in Washington, D.C.:
Nor can you afford to feel a lot of sympathy for the clients . . . . Some of them earn the
courthouse epithet "dirtball," but most of them are likable enough when you're trying to
help them, and you'd have to be a moral moron not to see that they are victims, too. It's
just that too much sympathy for the clients gets in the way of doing your job. You have
to sell them on the advantages of doing five years instead of ten. You have to watch the
iron doors closing behind them all the time.
"How CAN You DEFEND THOSE PEOPLE?": THE MAKING OF A CRIMINAL LAWYER 143
(1983).
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clients' weddings and their funerals. When clients were sent to
prison, I maintained contact with their families. Because I viewed my
clients as friends, I did not merely feel justified in doing all I could for
them; I felt a strong desire to do so.84

In the real world

of crime victims, as opposed to the tabloid world
of true crime stories and America's Most Wanted, the capacity for
empathy is surprisingly strong and seems to be inversely propor
tional to our distance from the object.85 Not surprisingly, juries
presented with the "stories" of actual people respond, as do their
counsel, with empathy and compassion, not with contempt and
detachment.86
It is in this respect that Uviller's rhetoric begins to echo the
crime rhetoric of the city from which he writes, accepting as truths
things that are either distorted or in doubt, and then constructing
elaborate and unnecessary remedies on their backs. The funda
mental characteristic that unites Uviller and his cohorts with the
police - and against existing rules of criminal procedure, criminal
defendants, and their lawyers - is a want of empathy. Like Travis
Bickle,87 they rage against a tidal wave of crime that exists in the
imagination, fueled by the media and by the isolation from others
that is part of modem urban life.
It seems reasonable to ask that before we embrace changes that
impair fundamental rights, there should be some demonstration
that the flaws are real and have costs. H, instead, the flaws are
imagined or the costs, if any, are minimal, then the only justification
84. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public
106 HARv. L. REv. 1239, 1272 (1993). Ogletree surveys the literature in this area
and notes that defense attorneys experience "burnout" most often because of excessive
caseloads, see id. at 1268, n.112 (citing NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, AssESSING CruMINAL
JuSTICE NEEDS 4 (1984)), as a result of which they must "appear regularly in court without
adequate preparation or sufficient time to meet with clients," id. (citing Stewart O'Brien et
al., The Criminal Lawyer: The Defendant's Perspective, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 283, 301 (1977)).
This source of burnout evinces an empathy with clients, rather than a disdain of them.

Defenders,

85. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Eleventh Chronicle: Empathy and False Empathy, 84
CAL. L. REv. 61, 76-79 (1996) (discussing norm theory, which holds that "reaction to a[ ]
person in distress varies according to the normalcy or abnormalcy of his or her plight in
[another's] eyes"). Delgado uses norm theory to explain why "[w]e find it easy to empathize
with the victims of crime . . . particularly if they are middle-class people like us." Id. at 89.
86. See generally Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89
MICH. L. REv. 1880, 1932 (1991) (noting that "most punishment now tends to take place out
of public view . . . [especially] in densely populated urban settings, where anonymity and
disinterest in others' lives often are governing rules of public interpersonal relations. Ac
cordingly, the public can distance itself psychologically from the process and results of pun
ishment"). This is certainly true in capital cases, in which the object of defense counsel is to
"humanize" the defendant and thereby enhance jury empathy, a phenomenon well
illustrated by the respective defenses of, and sentences imposed upon, Timothy McVeigh and
Terry Nichols, co-conspirators in the Oklahoma City bombing. It also accounts for the recent
success of so-called abuse excuse defenses, in which a jury relieves an offender of criminal
liability on grounds that the community outside the courtroom finds suspect or contrived.
See generally ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE ABusE ExcusE (1994).
87.

See TAXI DRIVER, supra note

1.

May 1998]

Police and Thieves

1455

for the reforms that Uviller advocates is the bare political prefer
ence for a different allocation of power between government and
individual. In that case, give me Judge Rothwax, a wolf in wolf's
clothing, rather than the sheepishness of Virtual Justice.

